The Degree of  Invention  Necessary to Sustain a Patent by Pierson, Roger G.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 6 Issue 2 Article 7 
Winter 12-1-1953 
The Degree of "Invention" Necessary to Sustain a Patent 
Roger G. Pierson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roger G. Pierson, The Degree of "Invention" Necessary to Sustain a Patent, 6 S.C.L.R. 201. (1953). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
NOTES
THE DEGREE OF "INVENTION" NECESSARY TO
SUSTAIN A PATENT
Introduction
During the past fifty years the pendulum of court decisions in
patent law has swung from one extreme position favorable to the
patentee to the present unfavorable extreme. In the past decade,
doctrines representative of cornerstones of certainty have either been
overturned or such confusion and doubt have been raised as to their
application that lawyers' opinions frequently have been the result
of pure speculation.'
Perhaps the more realistic and practical approach to the question
of the degree of "invention" necessary in a patent is that approach
which is most often evidenced in writings- the negative approach.
Conversely, another familiar approach is the affirmative approach.
In the former you find an analysis of the things which in the past
were, and thus ostensibly still are, unpatentable, and in the latter
there is found an analysis of the classic decisions reached by the
Supreme Court of the United States attempting in broad terms to
establish the test for things which are or shall be patentable. Be-
tween the two there appears a great abyss of confusion, uncertainty
and, to some extent, conflict, which it is the purport of this paper
to explore and explain a portion of, with a view towards narrow-
ing the gap of uncertainty-a combination of the negative and of
the affirmative approach with affirmative conclusions. The validity of
such an exploration may now be founded on the Patent Act of 1952,2
a bill introduced by the late Representative Bryson of South Caro-
lina,3 with particular reference to Section 1034 of the Act. This
new section is added with the view that an explicit statement in the
statute may have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a basis
for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be worked
out.
1. 15 The Shingle 213 (1952).
2. 35 U. S. C.
3. H. R. 7794, May 12, 1952 (82nd Cong.).
4. 35 U. S. C. § 103: "A patent may not be obtained though the invention
is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title,
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made."
201
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Section 103 is one of those matters of major importance; the
statutory inclusion of a requirement for "invention", which has
never before been dealt with in the statutes. Since it is firmly es-
tablished as a prerequisite to patentability, it was felt that it was
desirable to include it in the codification. And in doing so certain
troublesome matters were dealt with, but without any attempt to de-
fine "invention", the undefinable.
First of all, Section 103 is a statement that a patent cannot be
granted if "invention" is wanting, and want of "invention" is stated
in terms of "obviousness", "obviousness" in view of the "prior art".
And the "prior art" is that art which is prior according to Section 102.5
This obviousness must, first of all, be determined as of the time
when the "invention" was made. This is not new law, but here it
is where the courts cannot deviate from it. And it must be deter-
mined with reference to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
Finally, the last clause of Section 103 is intended to lay the ghost
of the "flash of genius" furore. It says, "Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made". That
is, long toil stands on an equal footing with genius.
Some of the critics crystallized an anti-patent attitude which de-
nied recognition of the inventor as a public benefactor and which
treated the grant to the inventor of his 17 year patent as a trespass
upon the public domain. The aggressive antagonism of a few with
their inaccurate and misleading treatment of the patent system ap-
pears as a heavy smoke-screen designed to obscure the constitutional
purpose of the patent system. Even on the bench there are a few
5. 35 U. S. C. § 102: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the appli-
cant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the
date of the application for patent in this country on an application filed, more
than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for
patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by
the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicants' invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In
determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the re-
spective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but
also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce
to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
[Vol. 6
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judges who still give voice to the anti-patent philosophy. The rise
of animosity recently became evident in the United States Supreme
Court and moved Mr. Justice Jackson to say that the only valid
patent is one upon which that Court has not been able to get its
hands.8
Against that background we have a new patent law, illustrative of
the faith of the Congress in the patent system as providing an in-
centive to invent.
History
The Constitutional Convention that wrote the American Consti-
tution spent so little time, if any, debating the provision with regard
to patents for inventions, that no debate is recorded. The inherent
rights of the individual naturally included the principle of owner-
ship for an equitable but limited period of the right to practice such
inventions and discoveries as he might make. No debate was needed.
It is interesting to note that this provision followed to a large de-
gree, if not entirely, suggestions made in the Convention by James
Madison of Virginia and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina.
The framers of the Constitution of the United States had the
wisdom and foresight to incorporate therein a provision concerning
inventions. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution invests
Congress with the power to enact the necessary legislation for the
protection of inventions.7 The clause reads as follows: "The Con-
gress shall have power ... to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
Based upon the constitutional provision, Congress has enacted
legislation pertaining to patents. Concerning Congress' right to
legislate, there is not the slightest doubt. The United States Supreme
Court has spoken on this question in the case of McClurg v. Kings-
land.8 In this case Mr. Justice Baldwin held that:
The powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject of pa-
tents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there
are no restrictions on its exercise, there can be no limitation of
their right to modify them at their pleasure so they do not
take away the rights of property in existing patents.
6. See note I supra.
7. 1 WxmxR oN PATZxTs, c. 1 (1937).
8. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U. S. 202 (1843).
1953]
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In view of the fact that patents are grants authorized by statute,
it is important to understand that only those classes of inventions
which are specifically enumerated by the patent statutes can be
given patent protection. Patentable subject matter, as enumerated in
the statutes, embraces five classes: arts, machines, manufactures, com-
positions of matter, or any new or useful improvements thereof and
plants, asexually reproduced, other than tuber-propagated plants. In
addition there is the provision for patents for a new, original, and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture.9 The meaning of
these designations, as laid down or interpreted by the courts, shall
be referred to later.
The historical development of monopolies and of inventions may
be traced from the Middle Ages through the Elizabethan and Ja-
cobean eras to the Statute of Monopolies of 1623 and to the adoption
of the American Constitution. A knowledge and understanding of
this development is important in that a thorough grasp may be had
of the salient distinctions between obnoxious and odious monopolies
and beneficial grants for inventions as contemplated by our Consti-
tution. Pursuing this investigation, we find the courts and writers
in considering the exclusive rights granted to an inventor under the
Patent Laws have reached divergent views. Some adhere to the
view that a patent is not a monopoly, whereas others, equally as
positive, express the opinion that a patent is a true and ideal monopo-
ly sanctioned by positive law. By any standard it is difficult, if not
impossible, to refer to a grant of a patent as an obnoxious monopoly.
The making of an invention is generally the result of personal ser-
vices, many sacrifices, much study, labor, ingenuity, and a consider-
able expenditure of time and money, and few persons have the re-
quired ability and inclination, without the hope of reward or re-
muneration, to devote the time, energy, and money to develop
improvements in the useful arts and sciences for the public benefit.
As the people are benefited by the development of inventions, it
is but natural that the inventor should receive some reward for
disclosing his invention to the public. Such a reward will also
stimulate inventive skill and energy and is one of the most effective
methods of advancing national prosperity. The mode of rewarding
the inventor is the result of statute law under which the inventor is
granted certain exclusive privileges for a limited period of time.
The grant of an exclusive privilege for a useful invention is not
the granting of a monopoly. A monopoly is the exercise of an ex-
9. See note 7 supra.
[Vol. 6
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clusive privilege granted to anyone for the sole buying, selling,
making, working, or using anything which the public had before
the exclusive privilege was granted.' 0
Many judges have rendered decisions expressing what is perhaps
the prevailing view- that a patent is not a monopoly or certainly,
if it is a monopoly, it is not obnoxious. The Supreme Court of the
United States apparently adheres to this view."1 In the case of
Allen v. Hunter'2 a dear, concise decision was rendered with respect
to this query:
Patentees are not monopolists. This objection is often made
and it has its effect upon society. The imputation is unjust and
impolitic. A monopolist is one who by the exercise of the
sovereign power, takes from the public that which belongs to
it, and gives to the grantee and his assigns an exclusive use.
On this ground monopolies are justly odious. It enables a
favored individual to tax the community, for his exclusive bene-
fit, for the use of that to which every other person in the com-
munity, abstractly, has an equal right with himself. Under the
patent law this can never be done. No exclusive right can be
granted for anything which the patentee has not invented or
discovered. If he claim anything which was before known, his
patent is void. So that the law repudiates a monopoly. The
right of the patentee entirely rests on his invention or discovery
of that which is useful, and which was not known before. And
the law gives him the exclusive use of the thing invented or
discovered, for a few years, as a compensation for his ingenuity,
labor, and expense in producing it. This, then; in no sense,
partakes of the character of monopoly.
From around 1790 to 1836, the patent system had so stimulated
the invention of new devices and utilities that it was revised and
put upon a permanent business basis in 1836. The Patent Office
was established as a separate bureau with a Commissioner in charge
and the examination system was put into effect as a part of the
American system. The growth and expansion of our economy in the
next 160 years under the United States patent system is the greatest
material achievement in human history. The first step in the produc-
tion of a new thing is getting the idea. The reward is offered to
10. Ibid.
11. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. (55 U. S.) 539 (1852).
12. Allen v. Hunter, 1 Fed. Cas. 476 (C. C. Ohio 1885).
1953]
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the man who can teach the public something new and useful. He is
the indispensable man, because his services are indispensable.
In addition to technological changes from 1870 to date, there were
equally important political and economic changes going on which
affected the patent system. It is difficult to select only the items
relating to the patent system when the patent system, the political
system, and the economic system all interacted to produce changes
in each other.
Cardozo said: "Logic and history, and custom and utility, and
the accepted standards of right conduct are the forces which singly
or in combination shape the progress of the law." "Which of these
forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon the com-
parative importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby
promoted or impaired. One of the most fundamental social interests
is that law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing
in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim.
Therefore in the main there shall be adherence to precedent. Yet
the subjective element, the unconscious forces, the likes, dislikes,
prejudices, the emotions, habits and convictions- the great tides
and currents which engulf the best of men-do not turn aside in
their course, and pass the judges by."'is
Patent Law Compared with Anti-Trust Law
That the basic philosophies upon which Patent Law and Anti-
TTust Law are founded are in contradistinction to one another is clear.
Some refer to the two as mortal enemies, while others take what
is perhaps a more pliable view that each is designed both to pro-
mote industry for the benefit of the individual and to protect the
individual against certain sinister tendencies attributed to the un-
controlled growth of industry. Whether the two philosophies can
be qualified to a point of refinement through which harmony may
be reached is not of primary concern here. The question most pro-
bably would resolve itself into academic theory with questionable
practical application. Suffice to say that a conflict does exist and each
has had caustic effects upon the other. The effects of this conflict
with respect to the degree of "invention" necessary in a patent is
our only concern.
The economic situation after the Civil War, the rise of the great
railroads, the exploitation of native as well as imported labor, coupled
with the increased power of these tremendous enterprises brought
13. Cardozo, Benjamin N., The Nature of the Judicial Process (1922).
Vol. 6
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the appearance of a phenomenon of more or less evil character. Com-
petitors began to realize that greater profits could be obtained by
entering into combinations and agreements among themselves restrict-
ing commerce.
One manifestation of this hostile attitude was a movement called
the Granger Movement. Other concerted movements sprang up
until the country had become thoroughly imbued with the evils of
greedy enterprise. Out of this hostility was born the anti-trust law.
This law would soon clip the wings of the industrial vulture.
Many inventors from about 1900 on, began to be employed by the
corporation and required to assign their inventions to the corpora-
tion as a part of their regular duties. More and more is matter of
invention organized into a phase of the manufacturing business. Be-
cause of the technological impossibility of maintaining private research
establishments, with respect to cost and otherwise, this appears to
be the outgrowth of necessity and practicality rather than any precon-
ceived idea of control by industrial corporations with an effort to
monopolize inventors or their inventions. Yet with the change in
the government's attitude, apparent with the passage of powerfully
extended anti-trust laws, what effect upon, what repercussions, what
subtle ramifications are there with respect to the courts' attitude to-
wards sustaining the patents of large corporations? More important
here is to what extent has this influenced the "degree of invention"
necessary in a patent? In its efforts to curtail the admitted evils of
over-extended industry, have the courts deprived inventors of their
natural and statutory rights and sacrificed a system, whose abolition
or emasculation is not merely a matter of slowing down our material
benefits but is actually a step towards national deterioration?
Illustrative of the difficulties today of patent owners is a recent
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, where a
patent owner was held liable for damages in a patent suit brought by
him, because of an anti-trust treble damages counterclaim, even
though the owner believed some of the patents were infringed. The
patent owner argued that holding him liable for bringing the in-
fringement action amounted to a denial of free access to the courts,
but, although the opinion agrees that free and unrestricted access
to the courts must not be denied or imperiled, it also insists that the
courts cannot be used as vehicles for maintaining and carrying out
an unlawful monopoly.14
In rendering such a decision language from American Tobacco Co.
14. 21 L. W. 1013 (1952).
1953]
7
Pierson: The Degree of "Invention" Necessary to Sustain a Patent
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
v. United States,1 5 an anti-trust suit with respect to size in an
attempted conspiracy to monopolize, was deemed appropriate. The
opinion there said that acts done to give effect to the conspiracy may
be in themselves wholly innocent acts. Yet if they are part of the sum
of the acts which are relied upon to effectuate the conspiracy which
the statute forbids, they come within its prohibition. The construc-
tion placed upon this United States Supreme Court decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit renders risky attempts to
enforce patent rights, especially in an atmosphere of extended hos-
tility. Why else should one whose rights have been invaded to his
best belief and knowledge be so heavily penalized? If it is an at-
tempt to stay a flow of litigation or to caution would-be offenders of
the anti-trust statutes, it reaches a danger point in denying justice
to those who seek honest clarification of their rights.
Words - Meanings and Usage
Another consideration is one which is not unique to the subject
under discussion, nor should it be the subject of generalizations or
profundities. Words never mean the same to two different persons
nor even twice to the same person. Each person has individual edu-
cation and experiences- no two have had a word presented to them
with the same associations. Research scientists, engineers and at-
torneys have different educations, read different books, talk different
shorthand to each other, think in different patterns, so that between
them mis- or non-comprehension is always possible. The judges
prefer clarity in documents, and consciously, or worse, unconsciously,
are prejudiced against an obscure and confused writing, be it a con-
tract, insurance policy, patent, or other paper. And, as a matter
of law, an ambiguous description in a patent, one that can be inter-
preted in two or more ways, is bad.16 Also, patent language of
doubtful meaning is to be taken most strongly against the one who
used it, namely, the inventor, 17 so that a patent for a useful result is
void if the description of the desired result differs from the descrip-
tion of the way to obtain the result.'8
From the days of the ancient Greeks, through the lifetime of Leo-
nardo da Vinci (1452-1519), until perhaps only 150 years ago a word
such as "gear" meant a single or a very small number of objects.
Today the word "gear" may mean any one of many thousands of ob-
15. American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 328 U. S. 781 (1945).
16. Texas Co. v. Sinclair Co., 87 F. 2d 690 (2nd Cir. 1937).
17. Hookless Fastener v. G. E. Prentice, 68 F. 2d 848 (2nd Cir. 1934).
18. Mitchell v. Tilghman, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 287 (1873).
[Vol. 6
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increased difficulty in ascertaining what would be a new "gear" out
of perhaps thousands of already applied "gears" is apparent. There-
fore, because of the inadequacy of chosen words, both technical and
otherwise, it is often very difficult for the judge or trier of fact to
comprehend, to distinguish the fine details-the improvements.
In any event, in reviewing many of the patent decisions wherein
"patentable invention" has been denied, the conclusion might be
reached that the degree of necessary "invention" was there, yet
because of miscomprehensions with respect thereto, often needless
and confused qualifications have been placed upon what constitutes
"invention".
Perhaps the culmination of an attitude of a tired court with respect
to this problem was reached by the United States Supreme Court
in the Cuno case,1 9 relying upon the classic "Flash of Genius" test.
Many authorities and some of the courts believed that a new and
perhaps insuperable standard of invention was being established, per-
haps forgetting Edison's definition of genius as 98%o perspiration and
2% inspiration. However, today, the Cuno decision, as previously
pointed out, has been abrogated by the 1952 Patent Law.
Drafting patent applications is an .art requiring large abilities and
great industry for success. The expert attorney will not only be a
master of English, at least to the extent that he can write grammati-
cally, logically, and pleasingly,- he should also possess, in high de-
gree, memory, to remember all the facts pertinent to what he is
writing and the relevant patent law principles, readiness of mind to
perceive the relations between the facts and the legal principles, and
imagination to appreciate the possibilities of the fact-legal situation.
All of this is not easy.
Review of Decisions
A brief skirmish with the views expressed by the courts with
respect to the "degree of invention" necessary should lend a better
conception to what has been previously referred to as an abyss of
confusion, uncertainty and, to some extent, conflict. To fully ap-
preciate and to understand the impact it is hoped the 1952 Patent
Law will have on this problem, it is fundamental that one become
acutely aware of this almost inextricable confusion. Only then can
we salvage the remnants of clarity and attempt to affirmatively assess
that which endures.
19. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automotive Devices Corp.; 314 U. S. 84
(1941).
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When an application is received in the Patent Office, after pro-
cessing in the initial stages, it is assigned to one of the divisions. Then
when it reaches the division, it is assigned to one of the assistant ex-
aminers on the theory that it goes to the man in the Office best skilled
in the particular art to which that application relates. It is his duty
to make a complete search of the prior art, which includes not only
American patents, but domestic and foreign publications and foreign
patents. Yet prior knowledge and use of an "invention" in another
country does not invalidate a patent granted here to an inventor who
invented without knowledge of such foreign invention and use.2 0
In general, when a person has invented some mode of carrying
into effect a law of natural science, or a rule of practice, it is the
application of that law or rule which constitutes the peculiar feature
of invention.2 1  Every useful art has its technique which is prac-
ticed by those who are skilled in it, and which is broadened in its
usefulness thereto from precedent to precedent. This is the process
of "evolution" -a phenomenon in which the expectable follows the
expectable. "Invention" is the antithesis of evolution, and connotes
necessarily the achievement of the unexpectable. It may properly
be said to occur only when a demand for an advance in an art has
built up a sufficient potential to cause the spark of some man's
thought, by jumping an uncrossed gap between an outpost of that
art and one of its desiderata, to give the world something new in
process, product, or device.22 In many cases claim of invention
thus described is based on the theory of chance discovery. While it
is true that invention may be the result of accident, and one seek-
ing a patent thereon need not ftnderstand or be able to state the
scientific principles underlying his claim,23 nevertheless he is charged
with knowledge of the state of the art and hence, even if he had no
actual notice thereof and therefore was experimenting blindly, he
cannot overcome the negation of invention which results from actual
disclosure by the prior art.
24
In order that a patent may be sustained it must appear that it
embodies the element of utility.23 One qualification apparent in the
decisions is that it is not essential that utility exist in a high degree.
20. Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U. S. 456 (1888).
21. Electric Smelting and Aluminum Co. v. Pittsburg Reduction Co., 111 Fed.
742 (W. D. N. Y. 1901), citing Sewall v. Jones, 91 U. S. 184 (1875).
22. Less Car Load Lots Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 10 F. Supp. 642 (S. D.
N. Y. 1935).
23. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U. S. 428
(1910).
24. Derby v. Thompson, 146 U. S. 476 (1892).
25. Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U. S. 1 (1884).
[Vol. 6
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It must be useful and beneficial to society.2 6 Nor can a device used
only for gaming be deemed useful, yet it is not invalid if used for
gambling where it is equally capable of use on machines used for
legitimate purposes.27 The element of novelty is an essential re-
quisite of the patentability of an invention or discovery. It is not
material that the patentee had no actual knowledge of the anticipatory
device.28 Moreover, a patent will not issue for an apparatus which
common knowledge would enable anyone to make or use.29 Results,
together with ingenuity in bringing them about, amount to "inven-
tion."
8 0
A classic decision was reached in the Barbed Wire Case8 L estab-
lishing the "last step test". Under such circumstances courts have
not been reluctant to sustain a patent to the man who has taken the
final step which has turned a failure into a success. In the law of
patents it is the last step that wins. It may be strange that, consider-
ing the important results obtained by the former inventor in his patent
for barbed wire, it did not occur to him to substitute a coiled wire
in place of the diamond shape prong, but evidently it did not, and
to the man to whom it did ought not to be denied the quality of in-
ventor. There are many instances in the reported decisions of the
United States Supreme Court where a patent has been sustained in
favor of the last of a series of inventors, all of whom were groping
to attain a certain result, which only the last one of the number seemed
able to grasp. Conspicuous among these is the case of Webster Loom
Co. v. Higgns.82  In answer to the argument that the combination
involved was a mere aggregation of old and well-known devices,
the court held that even though it may have been under their very
eyes, they may almost be said to have stumbled over it; but they
certainly failed to see it, to estimate its value, and to bring it into
notice. Now that it has succeeded, it may seem very plain to any-
one that he could have done it as well. This is often the case with
inventions of the greatest merit. It may be laid down as a general
rule, though perhaps not an invariable one, that if a new combination
and arrangement of known elements produce a new and beneficial
result never attained before, it is evidence of "invention".
26. Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U. S. 192 (1882).
27. Fuller v. Berger, 120 Fed. 274 (7th Cir. 1903).
28. As to what constitutes prior knowledge or use see 40 Am. Jur., Patents,
§ 33 et seq.
29. Preston v. Manard, 116 U. S. 661 (1885).
30. Nat. Cash Reg. Co. v. Boston Cash, 156 U. S. 502 (1894).
31. The Washburn and Moen Manufacturing Co. v. The Beat 'Em All Barbed
Wire C., 143 U. S. 275 (1891).
32. Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580 (1881).
1953] Nom
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Evidence is admissible, yet not conclusive, that an article previous-
ly unsalable, has been made salable by the invention in question. 33
Adaptation to a new use, such as the use of an old machine for a
new purpose does not constitute "invention". 34 The mere discovery
of an additional function in a device invented by another does not con-
stitute "invention". 35  A qualification of this dogmatic conclusion
might be inferred where it was held that the addition of a new ele-
ment to a combination is not "invention" unless the added element is
one not plainly indicated by prior art.3 6 Generally speaking, where
there is found an aggregation or combination "invention" is not in-
volved by merely uniting two elements.37 Yet a combination claim
may involve "invention", though every element is old, if a new result
is accomplished or an old result reached by a new and better way.38
A patentee may not, by improving one element of an old combination
whose construction and operation are otherwise unchanged, repatent
in effect the old combination by reclaiming it with the improved ele-
ment substituted for the old element.3 9
The application of an old purpose without any change in result
is not "invention". 40 The application of an old process to a new
material may involve "invention", but generally speaking it does not,
and especially where the method operates in the same way and effects
the same results. 41 Substitution of new materials may amount to
"invention" if it involves a new mode of construction, develops new
properties and uses, produces a new mode of operation, results in
a new function, is the first practical success in art in which substitu-
tion is made or in practice shows its more efficient action.
42
A change of form, size, place is generally held not to be "inven-
tion". Whether an improvement patent amounts to invention is a
question of fact,43 as is the determination of the fact whether the
improvement presents some uncommon advance in the art or mere
exercise of "the skill of the calling". 44 A patent for an improvement
33. Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U. S. 139 (1893).
34. it re Crews, 36 F. 2d 135 [C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1929].
35. In re Gauerke, 86 F. 2d 330 [C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1936].
36. Batcheller v. Henry Cole Co., 7 F. Supp. 898 (D. C. Mass. 1934).
37. Apex Electrical Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary and Clark, 21 F. Supp.
241 (D. C. Conn. 1937).
38. Kendall v. Trico Products Corp., 31 F. 2d 522 (6th Cir. 1929).
39. Lincoln Engineering Co. of Ill. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U. S. 545
(1937).
40. Armstrong Seatag Corp. v. Smith's Island Oyster Co., 254 Fed. 821 (4th
Cir. 1918).
41. David E. Kennedy, Inc. v. Beaver Tile and Specialty Co., 232 Fed.
477 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
42. Ottenheimer Bros. v. Lebuivitz, 5 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1933).
43. Thompson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U. S. 445 (1924).
44. Textile Machine Works v. Louis Hirsh Co., 302 U. S. 490 (1938).
[Vol. 6
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol6/iss2/7
in rubber tired wheels, consisting of a solid rubber tire held in place
in a flaring rim by the tension of two tightly drawn wires embedded
in the rubber within the periphery of the flanges, which had almost
universally been accepted as the termination of the struggle for a
completely successful tire, and a tire so constructed possessing the
function of rising, falling, and reseating itself under lateral strain,
was held to involve patentable "invention", and not to have been
anticipated by prior patents covering combinations of some of the
same elements, but which did not possess the distinctive "tipping"
function of the improved tire, and hence failed of commercial suc-
cess.
45
In another case, in support of the finding that the necessary degree
of "invention" was present, the court in summation of its finding
stated that the need had long existed; competent investigators had
tried to fill it; they had hit the target but not the bull's eye; the
art accepted and practiced the disclosure with success. 46 In retro-
spect it now seems inevitable, perhaps it was in time. Chemists were
bound in the end to learn how to electroplate chromium; it was
another species of an art well known. But if this is to be the test,
there will be few inventions, or none. The patent law need look
only to the last step which conquered what had so far balked advance.
Those decisions which emphasize the implications of existing knowl-
edge are speaking of smaller gains within the compass of the routine
chemist, electrician, or artisan; that is not a severe test. But while
the law grants its patent only to those whose originality is out of
the common, it does not demand genius.
An "invention" is a new display of ingenuity beyond the compass
of the one of average skill, and in the end that is all that can be said
about it. Courts cannot avoid the duty of divining as best they
can what the day-to-day capacity of the ordinary artisan will pro-
duce. This they attempt by looking at the history of the art, the
occasion for the "invention", its success, its independent repetition
at about the same time, and the state of the underlying art, which
was a condition upon its appearance at all. As said by Judge Learned
Hand, "Yet, when all is said,, there will remain cases when we can
only fall back upon such good sense as we may have, and in these
we cannot help exposing the inventor to the hazard inherent in hypos-
tatizing such modifications in the existing arts as are within the
45. See note 23 supra.
46. United Chromium, Inc. v. International Silver Co., 60 F. 2d 913 (2nd
Cir. 1932).
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limited imagination of the journeyman. There comes a point when
the question must be reached by a subjective opinion as to what
seems an easy step and what does not."47
In administering the patent law, the court first looks into the art,
to find what the real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is,
and whether it has advanced the art substantially. If it has done
so, then the court is liberal in its construction of the patent, to secure
to the inventor the reward he deserves. If what he has done works
only a slight step forward, and that which he says is a discovery
is on the border line between mere mechanical change and real inven-
tion, then his patent, if sustained, will be given a narrow scope, and
infringement will be found only in approximate copies of the new
device. It is this differing attitude of the courts toward genuine dis-
coveries and slight improvements that reconciles the sometimes ap-
parently conflicting instances of construing specifications and the
finding of equivalents in alleged infringements.
4 8
Yet any conclusion as to possible "patentable invention" is based
not only upon a study of the prior art- most of which is before
the court - but also upon the testimony of witnesses, lay and expert,
including the inventor, about the problem which the invention sought
to solve. And in determining whether there is invention, there must
not be too much reliance on admissions which the inventor may have
made in courts as to the meaning of the invention, but on'what the
patent discloses in its relation to the prior art as that art would be
viewed, not by a layman, but by one skilled in the art to which it
relates.
49
Somewhere within this galaxy of verbiage lies the answer to the
"degree of invention" necessary to sustain a patent. To say that
the courts have encrusted their decisions with superficialities; to say
that they have reached a lack of harmony or reciprocal unsuitability,
often verging on absurdity, would not only be an understatement
but at this point repetitious. The obvious inconsistencies must and
do become apparent, suggesting, perhaps, positive opposition or con-
trariety. Though it is a temptation, still it would not be entirely
accurate to say that the courts have embarked upon a course of com-
plete abandonment of even attempts to protect patent rights and in-
ventors' rights.
47. Kirsch Mfg. Co. v. Gould Mersereau Co., 6 F. 2d 793 (2nd Cir. 1925).
48. Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 261 U. S. 45
(1923).
49. Pointer v. Six Wheel Corp., 177 F. 2d 153 (9th Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 6
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1953], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol6/iss2/7
NOTES
The "Degree" of Iiivention
Whatever may be the effect of the new patent law shall ultimately
rest with the courts. It most probably will not, as might be hoped,
erase the existing blunders -yet it undeniably affords a certain
"reculer pour mieux sauter".50 Assuming, therefore, that there is
now the necessary equilibrant, the designation of "invention" could
approach some semblence of reasonableness, rendering experience
intelligible by bringing perceived particulars under appropriate con-
cepts.
Little, if any, comment could be passed upon the efforts made by
the United States Patent Office to give credulity to the applications
for patents. Perhaps the attitude of this office and the measure used
by it, compendiously stated, might best be shown by the 1948 words
of the Patent Commissioner in answer to the following questions:
What, if any, efffit is beifig made in the pateAt Office to bring
about a uniform attitude by the several hundred examiners on
the question of what amounts to patentable invention or what
rises to the dignity of invention? Does the patent office attempt
to follow the decisions of the courts in infringement suits on this
question?
To which he replied:
When I came into the patent office; I fouid that my prede-
cessor had set up a system of instruction for senior examiners.
Also, we conduct classes for the junior examiners. Those classes
are an attempt to get over the idea with respect to what shall
and what shall not, as a general matter, be considered patentable
inventions. You will understand that this matter of invention
is one that lies in the zone of the judgment of the individual,
and is very difficult to set in a pattern. It is almost impossible
to say, 'This is an invention and that is not invention' by any
rule of thumb. The important thing is to instill in the minds of
those gentlemen an attitude towards the question of invention.
In addition we hold weekly policy meetings with the super-
visors, and when an issue comes up and we find that there is a
decision which is applying very strict rules on the question of
invention, we attempt to define a policy that will be brought be-
fore the individual primary examiner.
As to this matter of invention, our feeling is that we can't
50. [F] to go back in order to take a better leap.
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take down the barrier because under the American system it is
one of the elements in determining whether or not an application
shall be allowed. It might be that some day this country would
be better off if we did like England. There anticipation alone,
not the question of invention in the sense that we treat it, is
involved in granting patents. I personally feel that there should
be a liberal feeling where the matter is really in doubt. I say
that because when a patent issues, then the owner of that patent
has a right to go into the court, and it may be at that time he
will be able by objective tests to support the patent, whereas those
objective tests would not be available to him in the Patent Office,
particularly those that depend on the passage of time.
I am afraid if we attempted to follow all the courts on this
question of invention, we would be lost. We don't go to the
liberal court for our standards, and we don't go to the tough
court, but try to go down the middle of the road.
In dealing with more basic considerations -the elements of utili-
ty, usefulness, and what is to be regarded as beneficial to society -
the courts have reached, perhaps to a distinguishable degree, perceiv-
able concord. Utility and usefulness might be combined thus defined
as a power to satisfy human wants; human wants, in this instance,
qualified to those "inventions" which are economically beneficial to
society. Any elaborate qualification with respect to this would ap-
proach intellectual frivolity.
Permeating the entire problem is that which has already been "in-
vented" and patented, referred to as the "prior art". It is in lieu
of this "prior art", in terms of one ordinarily skilled in the art,
whether or not the necessary novelty exists to carry it beyond that
point already reached. Necessarily, it must depend almost entirely
upon the factual situation, as in so many aspects of the law. In
applying these facts, the factors already considered together with
present considerations could spell out a working equation.
A prerequisite to "invention" is a thorough knowledge and under-
standing of the prior art, which is closely akin, similar to, or the
forerunner of the subject matter to be patented. Space does not
yield to an intricate blending, or an attempt thereof, of the sundry
interpretations expressing that which constitutes "invention". Per-
haps the best, or more honestly the easiest, way to conclude to a de-
gree what today constitutes the degree of "invention" necessary is to
review a June, 1952 decision in which there is a strong dissenting
[Vol. 6
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opinion,51 remembering that the new Patent Law was enacted in
July, 1952.
The "invention" in question relates to shipping containers fabri-
cated from multi-ply corrugated fibre board. The entire board is
made as a continuous strip and then suitably cut and scored to pro-
vide a blank from which is made the finished container. It is alleged
in the application that a container so made is lighter in weight and
cheaper to make than other containers of the same size and that this
result is obtained without loss of strength in the use of the containers.
This was apparently accomplished by omitting two outside facing
strips, ordinarily used as reinforcement, whereas in the application,
when the flaps are folded they overlap in pairs on the top and bottom
of the completed structure and when glued the flaps co-operate with
each other, providing the equivalent of a 3-ply top and bottom with
an additional ply of corrugated board as a padding at those points.
The court in its majority opinion held that omission of two outside
facing strips did not result in any unobvious or unexpected ad-
vantage because such advantage would be inherent. Further it stated
that if the omission of an element is attended by a corresponding
omission of the function performed thereby, there is no invention
if the elements retained perform the same functions as before, and,
although the applicant had made an improvement over similar struc-
tures as shown by the prior art, that was not sufficient to warrant a
granting of the patent if there be absence of invention. In the court's
opinion, no invention was here involved, because it thought that, in
view of the prior art, it would require no more than the skill of the
ordinary mechanic to produce a structure such as is shown in the
claims. The court also said that it would not involve invention if the
applicant or anyone else discovered that the device of that patent
is sufficiently strong without the re-enforcing parts, even if the omis-
sion of the inner facings from the container of applicant resulted
in a saving of cost, material, and weight without loss in the strength
of the container. All this, the court held, was not sufficient to bring
the involved claims into the patentable category.
In a dissenting opinion, the view was expressed that it is true that,
in the light of applicant's disclosure, it would not be difficult to modi-
fy the prior art devices of record to produce a device such as that
disclosed, but that this would not necessarily negative the presence
of patentable invention, because the conception of a new and useful
improvement must be considered along with the actual means of
51. Application of Nelson, 198 F. 2d 837 [C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1952].
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achieving it in order to determine the presence or absence of patent-
able invention. Although an ordinary person skilled in the art may
construct the device claimed, claims may be allowed where there is
no teaching in the prior art Which would have led him to do so, pro-
viding, of course that the claimed device displays the exercise of in-
vention. Quoting directly from the dissenting opinion:
"It seems to me that appellant by his simple changes has in-
deed produced what the majority refer to as an improvement-
in my opinion, a marked improvement - ad I fail to find in
the prior art anything that suggests the simple changes appellant
has made to achieve such improvement.
I am therefore of the opinion that the claimed device is not
only new and useful, but involves inventiohi over the art of
record."
So, in this case, although the majority opifi&it admittEd that iiiven-
tion would be cheaper, a saving of material and weight without loss
'of strength, patentability was deied. UmidTr the presift stattite, it
specifically states that "invention" must be detarniined With refdrdnce
to one having ordinary skill iii the art, i.nd so, it ijip&rs, that should
this case have been reviewed after Jlly, 1952, thB ipplicatibh would
have been sustained.
It is plain that what may appear to be kfi &-M-siinplication, might
be an implemental determinate. Learn Whiat th& iiviltor has done,
or is trying to do; study the applicable recorded it ind its functions,
purposes, and benefits; realize what new, improved functions can
be alleged or become apparent- determined with reference to a
person having ordinary skill in the art. Despite a degree of obvi-
ousness in the "invention", considering the "last step" decision to-
gether with a display of ordinary skill showing resultant economic
benefits (cheaper, less bulk, saving of material, etc.), it would ap-
pear that there is "the degree of invention necessary" to sustain
an application. Since the bulk of patent applications today are, to
a large extent, an improvement over or modification in one form
or another of prior art recorded, the importance of knowing accur-
ately the appropriate category into which the application shall fall
cannot be overemphasized. From this a knowledge and understand-
ing of that which exists is gained. From this knowledge one cail,
with a degree of exactness, analyze and appraise a patent applica-
tion, and determine whether "invention" exists. The strength of
the "degree of invention" most necessarily resolves itself to the
[Vol. 6
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factual situation. In any event, whether the facts be weak or strong
-- "invention" is the important issue, the strength of which should
be the only legitimate subject of contest and determination by the
courts. This strength could be, perhaps easily, determined in terms
of: (1) a precise presentation of applicable prior record, (2) a
precise presentation of the subject matter to be patented, (3) the dis-
tinctions between the two (if any), advances made, modifications
made, improvements made, etc., (4) the increased economic benefits
to the public.
With this before them, what need for the courts to become mired
in a sea of muddy, useless qualifications? One of the premises
upon which Patent Law is founded is that the public might benefit
from the ingenuity or "invention" of the individual. If the public,
or the country, could benefit in any way, why then could there not
be at least a basic recognition of the fact that the necessary degree
of "invention" is present? Any catalog of comparisons could be
carried on into tedious detail. It is time the courts gave more active
consideration to this initial concept and less time to what has been
referred to as "devining as best they can what the day to day capaci-
ty of the ordinary artisan will produce".
Conclusion
No attempt has been made to pre-judge the issue nor has it been
considered desirable. There are myriad problems, none easy. Much
has been raised as a question, not an assertion.
Bad laws and hostile courts shaclde progress by driving "inven-
tions" underground. "Inventions" are valuable property whether
owned by an individual or by a corporation, and every effort should
be made to protect this property. The judiciary should neither be
oblivious to the times nor a product of them; rather as bringing to
the conflicts of the times the balancing effect of the law. The judge
should not yield to the temptation of fragmentizing the law by judg-
ments of expediency which shatter the integrity of the law in the
interest of apparent social gain.
It is probable that the favorable attitude of Congress towards in-
ventors will correct any tendency of courts to disregard patent rights.
The fact that the 1952 Patent Act was passed by unanimous consent
shows that Congress is in complete agreement with the conclusion
that a strong patent system should be maintained in this country, and
1953]
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that the best public policy on patents is the liberal policy originally
expressed in the Constitution. 52
There is an inescapable relation between the truth without
us and the truth within. The spirit of the age as it is revealed
to each of us is too often the spirit of the group in which the
accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have
given us a place. The eccentricities of judges balance one an-
other. The same is true of juries. There are flaws in every
human institution. There is no assurance that the rule of the
majority will be the expression of perfect reason when embodied
in constitution or in statute. We ought not to expect more of
it when embodied in the judgment of the courts. But the sands
of error crumble. We worry ourselves overmuch about the en-
during consequences of our errors. They may work a little
confusion for a time. In the end, they will be modified or cor-
rected or ignored. The future takes care of such things.5 3
RoGER G. PIIaSON, JR.
52. 39 Am. BAR Assoc. JoURNAL 212 (1953).
53. See note 13 supra.
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